Handbook of game theory with economic applications
Vol. 3 .Strategic equilibrium /Eric Van Damme --Foundations of strategic equilibrium /John Hillas and Elon Kohlberg --Incomplete information /Robert J. Aumann and Aviad Heifetz --Non-zero-sum two-person games /T.E.S. Raghavan --Computing equilibria for two-person games /Bernhard Von Stengel --Non-co...
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| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
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Amsterdam, New York
North-Holland Elsevier Science Pub. Co. (distributor)
1992, 1992
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| Series: | [Handbooks in economics
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | |
| Collection: | Elsevier Handbooks in Economics - Collection details see MPG.ReNa |
| Summary: | Vol. 3 .Strategic equilibrium /Eric Van Damme --Foundations of strategic equilibrium /John Hillas and Elon Kohlberg --Incomplete information /Robert J. Aumann and Aviad Heifetz --Non-zero-sum two-person games /T.E.S. Raghavan --Computing equilibria for two-person games /Bernhard Von Stengel --Non-cooperative games with many players /M. Ali Khan and Yeneng Sun --Stochastic games /Jean-François Mertens --Stochastic games: recent results /Nicolas Vielle --Game theory and industrial organization /Kyle Bagwell and Asher Wolinsky --Bargaining with incomplete information /Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton and Raymond J. Deneckere --Inspection games /Rudolf Avenhaus, Bernhard Von Stengel and Shmeuel Zamir --Economic history and game theory /Avner Greif --Shapley Value /Eyal Winter --Variations on the Shapley value /Dov Monderer and Dov Samet --Values of non-transferable utility games /Richard P. McLean --Values of games with infinitely many players /Abraham Neyman --Values of perfectly competitive economies /Sergiu Hart --Some other economic applications of the value /Jean-François Mertens --Strategic aspects of political systems /Jeffrey S. Banks --Game-theoretic analysis of legal rules and institutions /Jean-Pierre Benoît and Lewis A. Kornhauser --Implementation theory /Thomas R. Palfrey --Game theory and experimental gaming /Martin Shubik. Vol. 2 .Zero-sum two-person games /T.E.S. Raghavan --Game theory and statistics /Gideon Schwarz --Differential games /Avner Friedman --Differential games -- economic applications /Simone Clemhout and Henry Y. Wan, Jr. --Communication, correlated equilibria and incentive compatibility /Roger B. Myerson --Signalling /David M. Kreps and Joel Sobel --Moral hazard /Prajit K. Dutta and Roy Radner --Search /John McMillan and Michael Rothschild --Game theory and Evolutionary biology /Peter Hammerstein and Reinhard Selten --Game theory models of peace and war /Barry O'Neill --Voting procedures /Steven J. Brams --Social choice /Hervé Moulin --Power and stability in politics /Philip D. Straffin Jr. --Game theory and public economics /Mordecai Kurz --Cost allocation /H.P. Young --Cooperative models of bargaining /William Thomson --Games in coalitional form /Robert J. Weber --Coalition structure /Joseph Greenberg --Game-theoretic aspects of computing /Nathan Linial --Utility and subjective probability /Peter C. Fishburn --Common knowledge /John Geanakoplos. V.4. Rationality ; Advances in Zero-Sum Dynamic Games ; Games on Networks ; Reputations in Repeated Games ; Coalition Formation ; Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics ; Advances in Auctions ; Combinatorial Auctions ; Algorithmic Mechanism Design: Through the lens of Multiunit auctions ; Behavioral Game Theory Experiments and Modeling ; Evolutionary Game Theory in Biology ; Epistemic Game Theory ; Population Games and Deterministic Evolutionary Dynamics ; The Complexity of Computing Equilibria ; Theory of Combinatorial Games ; Game Theory and Distributed Control ; Ambiguity and Nonexpected Utility ; Calibration and Expert Testing. Vol. 1.Game of chess /Herbert A. Simon and Jonathan Schaeffer --Games in extenive and strategic forms /Sergiu Hart --Games with perfect information /Jan Mycielski --Repeated games with complete information /Sylvain Sorin --Repeated games of incomplete information: zero-sum /Shmuel Zamir --Repeated games of incomplete information : non-zero-sum /Françoise Forges --Noncooperative models of bargaining /Ken Binmore, Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein --Strategic analysis of auctions /Robert Wilson --Location /Jean J. Gabszewicz and Jacques-François Thisse --Strategic models of entry deterrence /Robert Wilson --Patent licensing /Morton I. Kamien --Core and balancedness /Yakar Kannai --Axiomatizations of the core /Bezalel Peleg --Core in perfectly competitive economics /Robert M. Anderson --Core in imperfectly competitive economies /Jean J. Gabszewicz and Benyamin Shitovitz --Two-sided matching /Alvin E. Roth and Marilda Sotomayor --Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets /William F. Lucas --Bargaining set, kernel, and nucleolus /Michael Maschler --Game and decision theoretic models in ethics /John C. Harsanyi. This is the third volume of the Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications. Since the publication of multi-Volume 1 a decade ago, game theory has continued to develop at a furious pace, and today it is the dominant tool in economic theory. The three volumes together cover the fundamental theoretical aspects, a wide range of applications to economics, several chapters on applications to political science and individual chapters on applications to disciplines as diverse as evolutionary biology, computer science, law, psychology and ethics. The authors are the most eminent practitioners in the field, including three Nobel Prize winners. The topics covered in the present volume include strategic ("Nash") equilibrium; incomplete information; two-person non-zero-sum games; noncooperative games with a continuum of players; stochastic games; industrial organization; bargaining, inspection; economic history; the Shapley value and its applications to perfectly competitive economies, to taxation, to public goods and to fixed prices; political science; law mechanism design; and game experimentation |
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| Item Description: | Includes bibliographical references and index. - Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. |
| Physical Description: | illustrations |
| ISBN: | 9780444537669 044453766X 0444894284 9780444894281 |