The WTO and the political economy of trade policy [Research Reviews]
Jonathan Eaton and Gene M. Grossman (1986), 'Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy Under Oligopoly', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101 (2), May, 383-406 -- Arye L. Hillman and Heinrich W. Ursprung (1988), 'Domestic Politics, Foreign Interests and International Trade Policy', Amer...
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| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
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Cheltenham, UK
Edward Elgar
2008
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| Series: | Critical perspectives on the global trading system and the WTO
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| Collection: | Edward Elgar eBook Archive - Collection details see MPG.ReNa |
| Summary: | Jonathan Eaton and Gene M. Grossman (1986), 'Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy Under Oligopoly', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101 (2), May, 383-406 -- Arye L. Hillman and Heinrich W. Ursprung (1988), 'Domestic Politics, Foreign Interests and International Trade Policy', American Economic Review, 78 (4), September, 729-45 -- Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994), 'Protection for Sale', American Economic Review, 84 (4), September, 833-50 -- James H. Cassing (1996), 'Protectionist Mutual Funds', European Journal of Political Economy, 12 (1), April, 1-18 -- Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg and Giovanni Maggi (1999), 'Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation', American Economic Review, 89 (5), December, 1135-55 -- JoAnne Feeney and Arye L. Hillman (2004), 'Trade Liberalization Through Asset Markets', Journal of International Economics, 64, 151-67 -- Wilfred J. Ethier (2006), 'Selling "Protection for Sale"', Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting and Economics, 13, 153-62 -- Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger (1999), 'An Economic Theory of GATT', American Economic Review, 89 (1), March, 215-48 Wilfred J. Ethier (2004), 'Political Externalities, Nondiscrimination and a Multilateral World', Review of International Economics, 12 (3), 303-20 -- Warren F. Schwartz and Alan O. Sykes (1996), 'Toward a Positive Theory of the Most Favored Nation Obligation and Its Exceptions in the WTO/GATT System', International Review of Law and Economics, 16 (1), March, 27-51 -- Henrik Horn and Petros C. Mavroidis (2001), 'Economic and Legal Aspects of the Most-Favored-Nation Clause', European Journal of Political Economy, 17, 233-79 -- J.M. Finger, H. Keith Hall and Douglas R. Nelson (1982), 'The Political Economy of Administered Protection', American Economic Review, 72 (3), June, 452-66 -- Robert W. Staiger and Guido Tabellini (1987), 'Discretionary Trade Policy and Excessive Protection', American Economic Review, 77 (5), December, 823-37 -- Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger (1990), 'A Theory of Managed Trade', American Economic Review, 80 (4), September, 779-95 -- Wilfred J. Ethier (1991), 'The Economics and Political Economy of Managed Trade', in Arye L. Hillman (ed) (ed.), Markets and Politicians: Politicized Economic Choice, Chapter 14, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 283-306 -- Steven Berry, James Levinsohn and Ariel Pakes (1999), 'Voluntary Export Restraints on Automobiles: Evaluating a Trade Policy', American Economic Review, 89 (3), June, 400-430 -- Wilfred J. Ethier (2002), 'Unilateralism in a Multilateral World', Economic Journal, 112 (479), April, 266-92 Wolfgang Mayer (1981), 'Theoretical Considerations on Negotiated Tariff Adjustments', Oxford Economic Papers, New Series, 33 (1), March, 135-53 -- Avinash Dixit (1987), 'Strategic Aspects of Trade Policy', in Truman F. Bewley (ed) (ed.), Advances in Economic Theory: Fifth World Congress, Chapter 9, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 329-62 -- Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1995), 'Trade Wars and Trade Talks', Journal of Political Economy, 103 (4), August, 675-708 -- Arye L. Hillman and Peter Moser (1996), 'Trade Liberalization as Politically Optimal Exchange of Market Access', in Matthew B. Canzoneri (ed), Wilfred J. Ethier (ed) and Vittorio Grilli (ed) (eds), The New Transatlantic Economy, Chapter 10, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 295-312 -- Giovanni Maggi and Andrés Rodríguez-Clare (1998), 'The Value of Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressures', Journal of Political Economy, 106 (3), June, 574-601 -- Recommended readings (Machine generated): Harry G. Johnson (1953-54), 'Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation', Review of Economic Studies, 21 (2), 142-53 -- Richard E. Caves (1976), 'Economic Models of Political Choice: Canada's Tariff Structure', Canadian Journal of Economics, IX (2), May, 278-300 -- William A. Brock and Stephen P. Magee (1978), 'The Economics of Special Interest Politics: The Case of the Tariff', American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 68 (2), May, 246-50 -- Arye L. Hillman (1982), 'Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Motives', American Economic Review, 72 (5), December, 1180-87 -- Wolfgang Mayer (1984), 'Endogenous Tariff Formation', American Economic Review, 74 (5), December, 970-85 -- James H. Cassing and Arye L. Hillman (1986), 'Shifting Comparative Advantage and Senescent Industry Collapse', American Economic Review, 76 (3), June, 516-23 -- This indispensable volume brings together the key contributions to the academic literature on the subject of the political economy of trade policy. Topics covered include unilateral and multilateral trade policies, international trade agreements and administered protection. In their comprehensive introduction, the editors present an insightful discussion of the political economy approach, the development of multilateral trade agreements, the trade and internal motives that guide unilateral trade policy and the features that characterise unilateralism. This volume is essential for professors, researchers and policymakers concerned with international trade policy |
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| Physical Description: | xix, 599 p |
| ISBN: | 9781785366796 |