Belief about the self a defense of the property theory of content
Philosophers typically suppose that the contents of our beliefs and other cognitive attitudes are propositions - things that might be true or false, and their truth values do not vary from time to time, place to place, or person to person. Neil Feit argues that this view breaks down in the face of b...
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| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
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Oxford
Oxford University Press
2008, c2008
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| Collection: | Oxford University Press - Collection details see MPG.ReNa |
| Summary: | Philosophers typically suppose that the contents of our beliefs and other cognitive attitudes are propositions - things that might be true or false, and their truth values do not vary from time to time, place to place, or person to person. Neil Feit argues that this view breaks down in the face of beliefs about the self |
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| Physical Description: | xvi, 195 p. |
| ISBN: | 9780199866922 0199866929 |